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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of economic misery on criminal activity the small island state, 
Barbados, using Markov-switching models.  No evidence of a contemporaneous relationship 
between economic misery and crime was uncovered.  On the other hand, Property and Theft of 
Motor crime respond to the state of misery with a lag of one period, supporting the criminal 
motivation effect. Economic misery is in the same regime as Property crime 50 percent of the 
time, and with Theft from Motor crime almost 60 percent of the time.  There is a procyclical 
contemporaneous relationship between inflation and Property crime, lasting up to two periods.  
Unemployment’s impact on Theft of Motor crime manifests after three periods, and supports 
the criminal opportunity hypothesis.  Finally, Fraud-related crime and unemployment are 
concordant.  Typical demand side policies to reduce the level of misery may not have the 
desired effect on crime, as reducing the unemployment rate or inflation rate respectively, could 
lead to an increase in the rate of crime, via the Phillips curve relationship.  The most promising 
course of action may be supply side policies, designed to improve the long-run performance of 
the economy.  
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1. Introduction 
Crime has historically been viewed as a major socio-economic issue. Socially, victims of crime 
can experience increased levels of distress and fear, while escalating crime levels in society 
may lead to a more fearful and overly cautious population.  On the other side of the coin, 
offenders who are caught and reprimanded face exile from society during incarceration, and 
typically find it difficult to successfully re-enter society upon completion of their punishment.  
In terms of the economic impact, policymakers direct precious and oftentimes scarce resources 
away from productive sectors in order to increase protection for citizens and further combat 
criminal activity.  These include purchases of weapons and equipment for law enforcers, while 
time is also devoted to efforts at preventing and solving crimes.  In addition, time spent by 
criminals, both in the act of crime and in prison, can be viewed as wasted resources.  Against 
this backdrop, it is not surprising that policymakers and academics have a keen interest in 
understanding the determinants of crime.  This interest has generated a proliferation of work 
conceptualising and testing criminological theories, including the impact of economic welfare 
on crime.  
 
It is generally understood that during periods of economic hardship, some persons turn to crime 
to compensate for income deficiencies.  Not only does society expect criminal activity to be 
more prevalent during economic hardship, they also expect criminals to be more willing to take 
advantage of other’s economic misery. In fact the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and 
Research (2012) conclude that factors affecting the economic well-being of society have a 
greater impact on crime levels than measures that influence the risk of arrest or the severity of 
punishment. However, there some evidence to date reject this hypothesis.  Some authors find 
that crime rates and economic indicators either diverge (Uggen, 2012) or no relationship exists 
(Young, 1993). 
 
The “Great Recession” has renewed the debate about whether a nexus exists between economic 
conditions and crime. After five years of global economic crisis, labour markets worldwide 
continue to be severely affected by low economic growth rates. By the end of 2012, 197 million 
people were jobless while another 39 million had given up on finding employment during the 
year (ILO, 2013).  Policymakers and society alike have become increasingly concerned about 
the potential incentive unemployed persons have to engage in criminal activity for personal 
gain.  However, a key question is, should they be concerned? One of the benefits of the 
recession was reduced inflation, caused by lower demand. Devine et al (1988) link inflation to 
increases in property crime.  They posit that since inflation reduces the ‘real income’ of 
workers, a concurrent rise in the demand for illegal goods often accompanies high inflation 
periods. Hence, it is possible that the impact of rising unemployment could have been mitigated 
by lower rates of inflation 
 
This paper seeks to test this hypothesis. We investigate the impact of economic conditions on 
crime using Okun’s misery index. This index takes into account not only the rates of 
unemployment, but also the level of inflation within and is a practical indicator of economic 
conditions. The authors focus on the case on Barbados – a small island developing state. In 
evaluating the literature, most of the extant theoretical and empirical work is based on larger 
economies.  But, are these findings applicable to small island states? By focusing on Barbados, 
the paper provides some insight into the relationship between economic conditions and 
economic misery in developing microstates, a niche which has been largely ignored in the 
literature. 
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Another appeal to studying the case of Barbados is that the island among the few countries that 
is highly sensitive to increases in crime Barbados depends heavily on tourism for income and 
economic growth (Jackman, 2012; Lorde et al., 2011; Worell et. al., 2011). Any increase in the 
risk of being affected by criminal activity will reduce the probability of a tourist choosing 
Barbados as a vacation destination. In fact, Lorde and Jackman (2013) estimate that a 1% 
increase in the crime rate results in a total economic loss of about US$150,000 or 0.04 percent 
of GDP while noting that in practice the magnitude is likely to be much greater. For many 
years, the tourism industry has been somewhat sheltered from inordinate criminal activity by a 
sense of social responsibility to the upkeep of the nation’s main productive industry. Violation 
of this social contract could cause not only decisive damage to the tourism industry, but also 
the disruption of one of the world’s more peaceful luxury vacation destinations.  
 
The reliance of the Barbadian economy on tourism and of tourism on a crime-free environment 
creates a potentially harmful cycle of misery; a challenging economic environment may cause 
crime rates to increase, further harming economic well-being and triggering spiralling levels 
of crime. This harsh possibility is pertinent to the perilous situation in which Barbados finds 
itself five years after the global economic crisis began to negatively impact its main income-
generating industry. The complexities of such a cycle are particularly critical for an industry 
that has performed well below its best in the past couple years (ECLAC, 2013). The imposition 
of further pressure on the Barbadian and global economic environments make this research a 
very timely practical guide for policymakers.  
 
 
2. Review of the Related Literature 
Most studies analysing economic conditions as a causal factor in explaining criminal activities 
stem from the seminal works of Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973).  Embracing the theories of 
rational behaviour, Becker postulated that individuals weigh the benefits and costs of crime to 
determine whether it is, in fact, reasonable to engage in criminal activity. In this model, a 
criminal act is preferred and conducted if the total payoff is above that of legal alternatives. 
Ehrlich extended the work of Becker, focusing on the opportunity cost of time spent in legal 
and illegal job activities. In this model, the individual is free to combine a number of 
illegitimate and legitimate activities, or switch occasionally from one to another at any point in 
his/her life. Ultimately, individuals choose to maximize their utility by the optimal allocation 
of time and other resources to competing legal and illegal activities.  Moreover, opportunities 
available in legitimate and illegitimate markets can help to determine the extent of participation 
in criminal activity.  
 
The Becker-Ehrlich type models hint that there should be a positive relationship between 
unemployment and criminal activity, dubbed the motivation effect. Specifically, higher 
unemployment reduces the probability of legal employment and expected income, thus making 
criminal activity more attractive. While a positive relationship between unemployment and 
criminal activities is intuitively appealing, the logic does have its detractors. For instance, 
Cantor and Land (1985) develop a theoretical model demonstrating that unemployment can 
have two opposing effects on crime.  In addition to the positive relation implied by the Becker-
Ehrlich type models, there is also an opportunity effect resulting in a negative correlation 
between unemployment and crime.  Cantor and Land opine that when more people are 
unemployed, there is less expenditure on physical property and there are more people at home 
to prevent traditional property crimes.  In this case, the observed relation between crime and 
unemployment depends on which effect dominates. 
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In line with the theoretical literature, the accumulated body of empirical work can be best 
described as mixed: some studies provide evidence that a rise in unemployment is associated 
with a higher crime rate (Altindag, 2012; Buonanno and Montolio, 2008; Elliot and Ellinworth, 
1998; Papps and Wikelman, 2000; Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001 Tang, 2009); there is 
evidence of Cantor and Land’s negative opportunity effect (Melick, 2003); and others find no 
statistically significant relation (Elliot and Ellingworth, 1996; Young, 1993).   Further, different 
types of crime have varying relationships with unemployment.  
 
These inconsistencies in the empirical literature often raise questions about the use of 
unemployment as the main indicator of the effect of financial distress on crime.   Indeed, 
modern macroeconomics defines welfare as a function of both inflation and unemployment (Di 
Tella et al., 2001).  Hence, unemployment alone may not provide a sufficient indication of 
financial distress; one might also consider the impact of inflation. There is some work to 
suggest that inflation impacts on crime.  For instance, Devine et al. (1988), argue that inflation, 
by lowering the real income of low-skilled labour, rewards criminal activity and increases the 
profits of the illegal goods market. Second, inflation causes a loss in social control by the 
destruction of public confidence in the existing institutional arrangements. Third, it diminishes 
the economy’s power to maintain adequate levels of deterrence against criminal activity. Teles’ 
(2004) theoretical framework supports the idea that inflation has a significant effect on the 
optimal level of time spent on criminal activities.  
 
To better measure how economic welfare might influence crime, it seems reasonable to include 
both unemployment and inflation in the empirical analysis.  Estimating the impacts separately 
can result in a loss of vital information and issues of misspecification.  But, when investigated 
jointly, these important effects pose econometric problems.  Specifically, Ralston (1999) 
provides evidence that including both unemployment and inflation in a multivariate regression 
on crime is likely to encounter the issue of multicollinearity, given the traditional inverse 
relationship between unemployment and inflation.  As such, Tang and Lean (2009) offer an 
excellent alternative: the authors use Okun’s misery index, i.e., the sum of the unemployment 
rate and inflation rate.  In this way, one is able to discern the net effect of inflation and 
unemployment on crime, while at the same time avoiding the misspecification errors in 
previous work. Tang and Lean uncover a link between economic misery and crime in the USA.  
Following suit, the authors of this paper opt to study the relationship between economic welfare 
and crime using the misery index, a more comprehensive metric than the rate of unemployment.   
 
 
3. Data and Empirical Approach 
 
3.1 Data 
The paper uses quarterly data (1999Q1-2012Q3) on unemployment, inflation and crime 
(Property, Theft from Motor, Theft of Motor, Fraud, and Robbery).1  Observations on crime 
were collected from the statistical unit of the Royal Barbados Police Force with the special 
permission of the Commissioner of Police, while those on inflation and unemployment were 
obtained from the Central Bank of Barbados databases. 
 
3.2 Measuring the state of the variables 
                                                             
1 Property crime includes residential burglary, commercial burglary, sacrilege, arson, attempted arson, and 
criminal damage.  Robbery is theft from an individual. 
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In modelling the relationship between crime and economic variables, it is quite common to use 
a linear model—which by construction assumes a stable relationship between the variables. 
Although these models are quite successful in numerous applications, they are unable to 
capture cyclical patterns present in variables such as crime, inflation and unemployment. 
Indeed, there are several periods in which these variables deviate from their long-term trend or 
steady state values. Hence, a linear model might provide a weak fit. As such, this paper follows 
Fallahi and Rodríguez (2010) and focuses on modelling the cyclical behaviour of the variables 
under the consideration.  The Markov-switching (MS) model of Hamilton (1989) is used 
identify the various states or cyclical behaviour of the economic misery and crime variables.  
 
In this paper, we begin with a simple MS vector autoregressive model of order k, written as: 
 
!" = $(&") +)*+!",- + ."
+
"/0
															(1) 
 
where $ is the regime switching intercept, &" is the variable denoting the regime, *+  are the 
coefficients on the autoregressive terms and ." is the error term. By allowing the intercept to 
depend on the cycle, the model implicitly assumes a smooth transition from one state to the 
next. 
 
Following Hamilton (1989), the state variable, &", is represented as an unobserved discrete-
time, discrete-state Markov process. The transition probability matrix is such that:  
 
3-4 = Pr	[&" = 8|&",0 = :]		<:=ℎ)3-4 = 1					?@A	BCC	:
D
4/E
																(2) 
 
The MS intercept model specified in equation (1) can be easily extended to allow for more 
general dynamic structures. For instance, regime switching can occur in the autoregressive 
regressive parameters, in the error variance (heteroskedasticity), and in the coefficients of any 
other included exogenous regressors. 
 
The estimation of equations is undertaken using the expectation maximization algorithm 
discussed in Hamilton (1990).  In addition, the smoothing algorithm of Kim (1994) is employed 
to assign probabilities to the unobserved state conditional on the information set. Davies’ 
(1987) upper bound for the significance of the likelihood ratio is used to choose the optimal 
number of regimes. The lag lengths are selected based on misspecification tests, parameter 
constancy tests, encompassing tests and information criteria.  A similar process is used to 
choose between dynamic structures of the MS models. 
 
3.3 Measuring the degree of synchronization  
Once the “state” of the variables in each time observation is identified, the degree of 
synchronization between the variables is investigated.  We employ the concordance index of 
Harding and Pagan (2002) to determine the fraction of time that the misery index and the crime 
variables are in the same state.  For two series !" and G", the index can be calculated as: 
 
HI = 1J K)LM"LN" +)(1− LM")P1 − LN"Q
R
"/0
R
"/0
S														(3) 
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where (LM", LN") are binary variables that take on a value of 1 when the  !" and G" variables are 
in a particular state (say s1) and 0 when they are not. Harding and Pagan (2002) suggest that if HI = 1, the series are procyclical, and if HI = 0, the series are countercyclical. Several issues 
arise: what if 0 < HI < 1; how high/low should HI be to interpret it as procyclical/countercyclical; 
and how does one determine if the synchronization is statistically significant? To address these 
issues, Harding and Pagan (2006) suggest estimating the following regression: 
 XYZ[,0XYZ\,0LN" = $ + ]ZXYZ[,0XYZ\,0LM" + ^" 														(4) 
 
where ]Z is the correlation coefficient.  If 0 < ]Z ≤ 1, then the series are procyclical, and if −1 ≤ ]Z < 0, the series are countercyclical.  In addition, the statistical significance of the 
relationship is tested using the t-statistic on XYZ[,0XYZ\,0LM".  Harding and Pagan (2006) also note 
that when ]Z = 0, the error term inherits the serial correlation properties of LN".  Thus, 
inferences must be made robust to the serial correlation, as well as any heteroskedasticity in 
the errors.  Hence, we adopt the Newey-West HAC method for standard errors.  	
 
 
4. Results 
The presence of non-stationary variables in econometric analysis can lead to spurious results. 
Hence, as a preliminary step to the empirical analysis, the order of integration is determined.  
The authors employ the familiar augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron unit root tests. 
The results (Table 1) suggest that Theft of Motor, Theft from Motor and Fraud crime series are 
stationary.  The Property and Robbery variables are trend stationary; hence a trend is included 
in the univariate MS model.  Finally, the misery index is I(1), and is differenced once before 
estimating its univariate MS model. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 2 presents the results of the univariate MS models for each variable. For the Property, 
Theft from Motor, Theft of Motor vehicles and Fraud crime series, only the intercepts are 
regime-dependent.  For the misery index, the intercept and the variance are regime-dependent, 
while for Robbery, the intercept, variance and autoregressive coefficients are regime-
dependent.  Each variable can be characterized by two states: s0 and s1. Based on the 
coefficients of the intercepts (and analysis of the regime classifications), for the misery index, 
state s0 relates to periods of declining misery, while for the crime variables, s0 appears 
indicative of states of low criminal activity.  It follows that state s1 relates to periods of 
expanding economic misery, while for the crime variables, this state corresponds to periods of 
high criminal activity. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 2 also provides the expected duration for each state.   For each variable the duration s1 is 
greater than that of s0.  The non-linear specification seems to provide a better fit than the linear 
models, as evidenced by the p-values associated with the LR chi-square tests and the 
approximate upper bound for significance.  The models also appear to be well specified as 
suggested by tests for normality and autocorrelation.   
 
 6 
Using the regime classifications of the MS models, the concordance index and estimated 
correlation is calculated for economic misery and the five crime variables (Table 3).  Looking 
first at the contemporaneous relationship, the concordance index is smaller than 0.5 for each 
variable, suggesting that crime and misery are not often in the same regime.  The correlation 
coefficients between economic misery and Property crime, Theft of Motor, Fraud and Robbery 
are each positive, indicating a procyclical relationship between each of these crimes and 
economic misery.  The only type of crime to buck this trend is Theft from Motor, whose 
correlation coefficient hints at a countercyclical relation between economic misery and theft 
from motor. To determine if these relationships are statistically significant, the t-ratios are 
estimated.  As shown in Table 3, the t-statistics are all insignificant at conventional levels of 
testing.  Hence, there is no evidence of a contemporaneous relationship between the state of 
economic misery and crime. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
It is possible that crime may have a lagged response to economic misery. Thus, we re-estimate 
the concordance index and correlation coefficients using lags of the misery index; that is, we 
assume that changes in the state of misery at t-i can possibly be related to the state of crime in 
period t.  As in the contemporaneous case, there is no evidence of significant relationships 
between lagged values of economic misery and Theft from Motor, Fraud or Robbery.   
However, the lagged misery index appears to have a positive and significant impact on both 
Property crime and Theft of Motor, hinting that the criminal motivation effect identified by the 
Becker-Ehrlich type models is stronger than the criminal opportunity effect of Cantor and Land 
(1985). Moreover, the concordance index suggests that economic misery is in the same regime 
as Property crime approximately 50 percent of the time, and with theft from motor 58.9 percent 
of the time; however, the relationships are very short lived, disappearing after one quarter. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
We also calculate separate concordance indices for the unemployment and inflation rates, to 
allow for comparison with the results of the misery index (Tables 4 and 5).  Similar to the case 
of the misery index, there is no evidence of a statistically significant contemporaneous 
relationship between unemployment and the five types of crime analysed in this paper.  
However, there is evidence of a strong procyclical contemporaneous relationship between 
inflation and Property crime, lasting for up to two quarters.  The results also suggest that it 
takes three quarters for unemployment to have an effect on Theft of Motor crime, and the 
impact is negative, lending credence to the criminal opportunity hypothesis.  Moreover, Fraud-
related crime (which has no relationship with the misery index) are significantly concordant 
with unemployment at a lag of one quarter.  
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper combines two appealing aspects of the literature on economic conditions and 
criminal activity to examine the small island developing country, Barbados.  First, we employ 
an index of misery that takes into account not only the rate of unemployment, but also the rate 
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of inflation within the country as a practical indicator of economic conditions. From a sound 
theoretical basis that suggests both unemployment and inflation have a strong correlation with 
crime, we solve some of technical issues encountered by previous research by combining them 
to form Okun’s misery index.  Second, we examine the nonlinearity of the relationship between 
economic misery and crime in Barbados by modelling the cyclical behaviour of the variables 
using Markov-Switching models and measuring the synchronization of their cycles via the 
concordance index. This deviates from the tradition of examining linear relationships on the 
basis that the variables under investigation are inherently cyclical and linear analysis is likely 
to provide a weak fit under these circumstances.   
 
No evidence of a contemporaneous relationship between the state of economic misery and 
crime was uncovered.  On the other hand, Property and Theft of Motor crimes respond to the 
state of misery with a lag of one period, lending support to the criminal motivation effect. 
Economic misery (lagged one period) is in the same regime as Property crime 50 percent of 
the time, and Theft from Motor crime almost 60 percent of the time.  There is a strong 
procyclical contemporaneous relationship between inflation and Property crime, lasting up to 
two periods.  Unemployment’s impact on Theft of Motor crime manifests after three periods, 
and supports the criminal opportunity hypothesis.  Finally, Fraud-related crimes and 
unemployment at a lag of one period are concordant. 
 
The typical demand side expansionary policies to reduce the state of misery may not have the 
desired effect on crime as reducing the unemployment rate may indirectly increase the inflation 
rate, at least in the short run, according to the Phillips curve relationship, and could lead to an 
increase in the rate of crime.  For the same reason, policies to tackle inflation could result 
indirectly in an increase in crime.  The precise impact will depend on the relative impact of 
each component on the state of misery.  The most promising course of action may be supply 
side policies, designed to improve the long-run performance of the economy; for example, 
increasing the productivity of labour by investment in training of the labour force and 
improvements in the quality of management, expanding the capital stock, and improvement in 
business efficiency, among others.  
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Table 1: Unit Root Tests  
 
 Nature of the Test 
(level) 
 ADF Test PP Test 
Order of Integration 
 Level 1st Difference Level 1st Difference 
Misery Index Trend and Intercept -1.013 -4.025*** -2.637 -3.368*** I(1) 
Property crime Trend and Intercept -4.123*** n.a. -4.019** n.a. Trend Stationary 
Theft of motor Intercept -3.076** n.a. -3.061** n.a. Stationary 
Theft from motor Intercept -4.039*** n.a. -3.911*** n.a. Stationary 
Fraud Intercept -4.976*** n.a. -4.898*** n.a. Stationary 
Robbery Trend and Intercept -3.945** n.a. -3.807** n.a. Trend Stationary 
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Table 2: Results of Univariate Markov Switching Dynamic Regressions 
 
 
Misery Index Property Crime Theft from Motor Theft of Motor Fraud Robbery 
 
Intercept(s0) -0.776[0.293] 1.843[0.286] 0.248[0.030] 0.080[0.043] 0.155[0.034] 0.173[0.047] 
Intercept (s1) 2.329[0.107] 2.487[0.311] 0.337[0.042] 0.111[0.040] 0.254[0.052] 0.509[0.081] 
yt-1(s0) --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- 0.269[0.140] 
yt-1 (s1) --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- -0.303[0.208] 
yt-1 -0.051[0.053] 0.288[0.087] 0.524[0.116] 0.455[0.163] 0.245[0.071] --------- 
yt-2 -0.005[0.055] --------- -0.344[0.098] --------- --------- --------- 
yt-3 -0.360[0.049] --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- 
yt-4 -0.394[0.051] --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- 
yt-5 0.042[0.055] --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- 
yt-6 -0.295[0.051] --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- 
yt-7 0.025[0.048] --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- 
Trend --------- 0.288[0.087] --------- --------- --------- 0.003[0.001] 
σ(s1) 1.434 [0.221] 0.183[0.022] --------- 0.014[0.019] 0.049 [0.008] 0.056[0.006] 
σ(s2) 0.315[0.068] 0.220[0.063] --------- 0.056[0.015] 0.155[0.029] 0.026[0.006] 
σ --------- --------- 0.058[0.006] --------- --------- --------- 
Average duration in quarters 
s0 3.10 8.00 39.00 2.82 3.50 43.00 
s1 1.78 3.50 11.00 2.09 1.09 5.50 
Specification tests – p-values 
LR-test (χ2) 0.004 0.018 0.016 0.007 0.000 0.020 
LR Upper-Bound  0.008 0.033 0.040 0.012 0.000 0.018 
Normality 0.975 0.824 0.215 0.228 0.396 0.988 
Autocorrelation 0.304 0.690 0.121 0.581 0.207 0.222 
Note: standard errors are in squared parentheses. 
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Table 3: Concordance Index Statistics – Relationship between the Misery Index and Crime  
 
 Property Crime Theft from Motor Theft of Motor Fraud Robbery 
Contemporaneous      
Concordance Index 0.468 0.383 0.489 0.468 0.426 
!" 0.133 -0.026 0.075 0.133 0.219 
t-statistic 1.110 -0.304 0.481 1.279 1.258 
      
Lag 1      
Concordance Index 0.500 0.413 0.587 0.413 0.391 
!" 0.205 0.041 0.279 0.013 0.064 
t-statistic 1.926* 0.583 2.280** 0.095 0.536 
      
Lag 2      
Concordance Index 0.422 0.400 0.444 0.444 0.356 
!" 0.019 0.013 -0.030 0.082 -0.095 
t-statistic 0.214 0.207 -0.192 0.807 -0.671 
      
Lag 3      
Concordance Index 0.419 0.419 0.674 0.395 0.279 
!" -0.071 -0.018 0.143 0.089 -0.258 
t-statistic -0.682 -0.279 0.986 0.877 -1.208 
Note: ***, ** and * represents significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of testing 
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Table 4: Concordance Index Statistics – Relationship between Unemployment and Crime  
 
 Property Crime Theft from Motor Theft of Motor Fraud Robbery 
Contemporaneous      
Concordance Index 0.373 0.451 0.490 0.431 0.333 
!" -0.044 0.144 0.083 0.117 -0.061 
t-statistic -0.266 0.905 0.734 1.099 -0.503 
      
Lag 1      
Concordance Index 0.340 0.420 0.440 0.480 0.340 
!" -0.091 0.107 -0.040 0.278 -0.004 
t-statistic -0.405 0.669 -0.250 3.728*** -0.028 
      
Lag 2      
Concordance Index 0.347 0.408 0.388 0.408 0.327 
!" -0.086 0.086 -0.157 0.086 -0.029 
t-statistic -0.505 0.546 -0.939 0.772 -0.178 
      
Lag 3      
Concordance Index 0.354 0.396 0.333 0.375 0.313 
!" -0.080 0.063 -0.277 -0.008 -0.055 
t-statistic -0.466 0.412 -2.350** -0.103 -0.532 
Note: ***, ** and * represents significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of testing 
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Table 5: Concordance Index Statistics – Relationship between Inflation and Crime  
 
 Property Crime Theft from Motor Theft of Motor Fraud Robbery 
Contemporaneous      
Concordance Index 0.652 0.565 0.478 0.522 0.587 
!" 0.253 0.070 -0.067 -0.010 0.103 
t-statistic 1.832* 0.772 -0.436 -0.084 1.001 
      
Lag 1      
Concordance Index 0.711 0.600 0.511 0.556 0.556 
!" 0.360 0.120 -0.010 0.040 0.020 
t-statistic 2.406** 1.160 -0.086 0.383 0.259 
      
Lag 2      
Concordance Index 0.636 0.591 0.455 0.568 0.523 
!" 0.196 0.078 -0.137 0.051 -0.067 
t-statistic 1.767* 0.948 -0.811 0.479 -0.835 
      
Lag 3      
Concordance Index 0.581 0.581 0.605 0.605 0.488 
!" 0.062 0.031 0.164 0.102 -0.160 
t-statistic  0.684 0.475 1.061 1.179 -1.316 
Note: ***, ** and * represents significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of testing 
 
  
 
